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Abstract
In this work, we consider the distributed stochastic optimization problem of minimizing a non-
convex function f(x) = Eξ∼Df(x; ξ) in an adversarial setting, where the individual functions
f(x; ξ) can also be potentially non-convex. We assume that at most α-fraction of a total of K
nodes can be Byzantines. We propose a robust stochastic variance-reduced gradient (SVRG) like
algorithm for the problem, where the batch gradients are computed at the worker nodes (WNs) and
the stochastic gradients are computed at the server node (SN). For the non-convex optimization
problem, we show that we need O˜
(
1
ǫ5/3K2/3
+ α
4/3
ǫ5/3
)
gradient computations on average at each
node (SN andWNs) to reach an ǫ-stationary point. The proposed algorithm guarantees convergence
via the design of a novel Byzantine filtering rule which is independent of the problem dimension.
Importantly, we capture the effect of the fraction of Byzantine nodes α present in the network on
the convergence performance of the algorithm.
1. Introduction
In the current machine learning landscape, with the data sizes growing exponentially, distributed
learning has become an important paradigm. In a distributed learning setup, multiple distributed
nodes along with a server node perform the learning task at hand. In distributed settings, the com-
putational load on the server node is relieved as heavy computations are usually distributed across
the multiple nodes in the network, see Dekel et al. [3], Ho et al. [4], Recht et al. [9], Zinkevich
et al. [17]. With multiple nodes in the network, the problem of robust learning becomes important
as some of the nodes in the network can potentially be Byzantine. These Byzantine nodes can ad-
versely affect the convergence performance of the algorithm. Therefore, it is important to design
algorithms which are robust to Byzantine actions and at the same time provide sufficient conver-
gence guarantees. In this work, we propose one such algorithm for distributed learning, when a
maximum α ∈ [0, 12) fraction of nodes in the network are Byzantines.
Many works in the past have looked into the problem of learning in the presence of Byzantines,
e.g., in Alistarh et al. [1], Blanchard et al. [2], Recht et al. [9], Su and Xu [11], Xie et al. [12, 13], Yin
et al. [14, 15]. However, only a handful have considered the problems when the objective functions
are non-convex, partially, because of the difficulty in dealing with the non-convex objective func-
tions, see Blanchard et al. [2], Xie et al. [12, 13], Yin et al. [14, 15]. In this work, we deal with
a non-convex optimization problem in the presence of Byzantines. To the best of our knowledge,
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this is the first work which provides guarantees for an SVRG-like algorithm (Sections 2 and 3) for
distributed learning in the presence of Byzantines with non-convex objective functions.
Related Work: In Su and Xu [11], a robust gradient descent (GD) based algorithm was proposed
in the presence of Byzantine nodes for learning with strongly convex objective functions. Also, in
Yin et al. [14, 15], the authors proposed Byzantine resilient GD algorithms for non-convex objec-
tive functions. Note that GD based algorithms require computations of the gradients of complete
batches, therefore, in Alistarh et al. [1], Blanchard et al. [2], Li et al. [8], Xie et al. [12, 13], the
authors proposed stochastic gradient descent (SGD) based robust learning algorithms in the pres-
ence of Byzantine nodes. In particular, Alistarh et al. [1], Li et al. [8], considered the objective
functions to be strongly convex and convex, respectively. On the other hand, in Blanchard et al. [2]
and Xie et al. [12, 13], the authors proposed robust algorithms in the presence of Byzantine nodes
for non-convex objective functions.
In this work, we consider a non-convex learning problem in the presence of at most α-fraction
Byzantine nodes. The proposed algorithm in this work is based on the stochastic variance reduced
gradient (SVRG) and stochastically controlled stochastic gradient (SCSG) frameworks proposed in
Reddi et al. [10] and Lei et al. [7], respectively, for non-convex objective functions. SVRG and
SCSG reduce the variance of stochastic gradients in SGD by introducing inner and outer loops
and by computing a batch gradient at the beginning of every outer loop. SCSG based algorithms
originally proposed in Lei and Jordan [6] have been shown to improve the performance of SVRG
by selecting the number of inner iterations in a random fashion, whereas SVRG chooses the inner
loop size in a deterministic fashion. Our work, extends the framework of non-convex SCSG to
distributed setting, even in the presence of Byzantine nodes. Below, we list our contributions:
Contributions:
• We propose a novel algorithm for distributed non-convex optimization in the presence of
Byzantine nodes. The proposed algorithm is a variant of the SVRG algorithm (Section 3),
where the computationally demanding batch gradients are computed at the worker nodes
(WNs) and the stochastic gradients are computed at the server node (SN).
• We provide convergence guarantees for the proposed algorithm as a function of α ∈ [0, 12),
which is the upper bound on the fraction of Byzantine nodes present in the network. Im-
portantly, we show that as the number of Byzantines reduces to zero (α = 0), the algorithm
improves the best known convergence rates for distributed non-convex optimization (Section
4) Jiang and Agrawal [5], Yu et al. [16].
• We propose a novel Byzantine filtering rule which is independent of the problem dimension.
Specifically, the aggregation rule proposed in this work does not perform coordinate-wise op-
erations and thereby the convergence rates are independent of the problem dimension. There-
fore, the proposed algorithm is suitable for high-dimensional learning problems.
2. Model and Assumptions
We consider a model similar to the one in Alistarh et al. [1]. We assume that there are K WNs and
a SN in the network. Specifically, we want to solve the following problem in a distributed fashion:
min
x∈Rd
f(x) = Eξ∼Df(x; ξ)
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where the functions f(· ; ξ) : Rd → R, for ξ chosen uniformly randomly from distribution D,
and f , can potentially be non-convex. All the nodes including SN have access to the stochastic
functions from distribution D. Of all the WNs, we assume that at most α-fraction are Byzantines
with α ∈ [0, 1/2).
The set of honest nodes is denoted by G. For each honest node k ∈ G, the following assumptions
are made.
Assumption 1 (Gradient Lipschitz continuity) All the functions f(·; ξ) for any ξ ∼ D and f are
assumed to be L-smooth, i.e., we have f(y) ≤ f(x) +∇f(x)T (y − x) + L2 ‖y − x‖
2
2, with L > 0.
Assumption 2 (Bounded Variance) For any ξ ∼ D we have ‖∇f(x; ξ)−∇f(x)‖ ≤ V .
Remark 1 Assumption 2 is also required in Alistarh et al. [1] to design the Byzantine filtering
strategy. Moreover, for α = 0, the above assumption can be relaxed to E‖∇f(x; ξ)−∇f(x)‖ ≤ V ,
which is a standard assumption in stochastic non-convex optimization literature.
For non-convex problems, it is generally not feasible to measure the suboptimality of the function
value, therefore, usually the convergence of non-convex problems is measured in terms of expected
gradient norm square, E‖f(x)‖2. Below we define an ǫ-stationary point for a non-convex optimiza-
tion problem.
Definition 2.1 (ǫ-Stationary Point) A point x is called ǫ-stationary if ‖∇f(x)‖2 ≤ ǫ. Moreover, a
stochastic algorithm is said to achieve ǫ-stationarity in t iterations if E[‖∇f(xt)‖
2] ≤ ǫ, where the
expectation is over the stochasticity of the algorithm until time instant t.
Next, we discuss the algorithm.
3. Algorithm
Now, we discuss the steps of Algorithm 1. As mentioned earlier, we consider a SVRG-like algo-
rithm, which can be thought of as a distributed version of SCSG, where the WNs compute the batch
gradients and share the computed batch gradients with the SN. Note that the algorithm is similar to
SVRG except the fact that the algorithm uses a geometric random variable to decide the number of
inner iterations.
The algorithm consists of a total of T epochs. At the start of each epoch t = 1, 2, . . . , T , the SN
broadcasts the point xt0 to the WNs. The WNs are then expected to compute their batch gradients
at xt0 and forward them to the SN. However, a Byzantine node forwards an arbitrary vector to the
SN. The honest WNs, on the other hand, compute and forward their batch gradients, µ
(k)
t . The
set S
(k)
t for t = 1, 2, . . . , T and k ∈ [K] consists of B i.i.d. sample functions f(x
t
0; ξ
(k)
t,i ) with
ξ
(k)
t,i ∼ D and S
(k)
t = (ξ
(k)
t,i )
B
i=1. Note that for simplicity, we assume the batch sizes |S
(k)
t | = B, for
all t = 1, 2, . . . , T and k ∈ G. Furthermore, a generalization with variable batch sizes at different
nodes is straightforward. To summarize, the vectors sent by node k at the tth epoch to the SN is:
µ
(k)
t =
{
1
B
∑B
i=1∇f(x
t
0; ξ
(k)
t,i ) if k ∈ G
∗ if k /∈ G
(1)
where ∗ indicates an arbitrary vector sent by the Byzantine node.
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Algorithm 1 Byzantine SVRG with Distributed Batch Gradient Computations
Input: x˜0 ∈ R
d, step sizes (ηt)
T
t=1, batch size B, Variance Bound V (Assumption 2), Tµ = 2V
√
C
B
(Lemma 9) where C = 2 log
(
2K
δ
)
with δ ∈ (0, 1) (Theorem 2).
for t = 1,2, . . . , T do
xt0 ← x˜t−1 → Push to WNs;
for k = 1,2,. . . , K do
µ
(k)
t =
{
1
B
∑B
i=1∇f(x
t
0; ξ
(k)
t,i ) for k ∈ G
∗ for k /∈ G
→ Push to SN
end
µmedt ← µ
(k)
t where k ∈ [K] is any WN such that |{k
′ ∈ [K] : ‖µ
(k′)
t − µ
(k)
t ‖ ≤ Tµ}| > K/2;
Gt = {k ∈ [K] : ‖µ
(k)
t − µ
med
t ‖ ≤ 2Tµ};
if |Gt| < (1− α)K then
µmedt ← µ
(k)
t where k ∈ [K] is any WN s.t. |{k
′ ∈ [K] : ‖µ
(k′)
t − µ
(k)
t ‖ ≤ 2V}| > K/2;
Gt = {k ∈ [K] : ‖µ
(k)
t − µ
med
t ‖ ≤ 4V};
end
µt =
1
|Gt|
∑
k∈Gt
µ
(k)
t ;
for n = 1, 2, . . . , Nt, Nt ∼ Geom(
B
B+1 ) do
vtn−1 = ∇f(x
t
n−1; ξ
t
n−1)−∇f(x
t
0; ξ
t
n−1) + µt;
xtn = x
t
n−1 − ηtv
t
n−1;
end
x˜t ← x
t
Nt
;
end
Output: x˜a chosen uniformly randomly from (x˜t)
T
t=1.
After receiving the batch gradients from the WNs, the SN performs a Byzantine Filtering Step.
In this step, the SN computes its estimate of the good set Gt. The server node then aggregates
the gradients received from the WNs in the set Gt and forms an estimate of the batch gradient, µt.
This is followed by the SVRG-like inner loop (n = 1, 2, . . . , Nt), where the inner loop size Nt is
chosen randomly using a geometric random variable with parameter BB+1 , i.e.,Nt ∼ Geom
(
B
B+1
)
.
The SN then performs the SVRG update step using the estimated batch gradient, µt, and stochastic
gradients computed at xtn−1 and x
t
0. Next, we discuss the proposed Byzantine filtering strategy.
Byzantine Filtering Step: To design the Byzantine filtering rule, the SN uses the computed batch
gradients from all the worker nodes, (µ
(k)
t )k∈[K] . Note that some of the received batch gradients
may be arbitrary sent by the Byzantines (see (1)). Below we define the Byzantine filtering rule and
then motivate its construction.
First, the SN computes the vector median of the received vectors (µ
(k)
t )k∈[K] using Tµ as defined
in Algorithm 1. Then the SN filters the nodes it believes to be Byzantines and constructs Gt using
the rule: Gt = {k ∈ [K] : ‖µ
(k)
t − µ
med
t ‖ ≤ 2Tµ}. Note that the above rule is motivated by
the fact that for good nodes k ∈ G, we expect with high probability the batch gradients to be
concentrated around the true gradient, ∇f(·). However, with non-zero probability, the above set
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can be empty or can have |Gt| < (1 − α)K . As we know that |G| ≥ (1 − α)K , we would
want to avoid such scenarios. For this purpose, if we have |Gt| < (1 − α)K using the first rule
(see Algorithm 1), we update the definition of the median using 2V to define the new median and
construct: Gt = {k ∈ [K] : ‖µ
(k)
t − µ
med
t ‖ ≤ 4V}. This condition ensures that we always have
|Gt| ≥ (1 − α)K . Note that the Byzantine filtering rule is similar to the one used in Alistarh et al.
[1]. However, in contrast to Alistarh et al. [1], we do not maintain a running sum of any statistic
to filter Byzantines. Instead, we control the impact of Byzantine nodes by selecting a batch size
appropriately. Importantly, Alistarh et al. [1] considered only convex objectives. Next, we provide
the guarantees for the algorithm.
4. Convergence Guarantees
Let us denote by EGcomp, SN(ǫ) the expected number of total gradient computations required at the
SN (same number of computations are required at individual WNs) to reach an ǫ-stationary point.
By Algorithm 1 we have:
EGcomp, SN(ǫ) =
T∑
t=1
(B + E[Nt]) = 2TB with Nt ∼ Geom
(
B
B + 1
)
.
where T is the number of iterations required to reach an ǫ-stationary point (see Output of Algorithm
1). Next, we state the convergence result.
Theorem 2 If Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied, for step size ηt = η =
1
3LB2/3
and B ≥ 16 such
that we have δ ∈ (0, 1) such that: e
δB
2(1−2δ) ≤ 2Kδ ≤ e
B
2 and δ ≤ 125KB then we have:
E‖∇f(x˜a)‖
2 ≤
12LE[f(x˜0)− f(x˜
∗)]
TB1/3︸ ︷︷ ︸
T=O
(
1
ǫB1/3
)
+
32V2
(1− α)2KB︸ ︷︷ ︸
B=O( 1ǫK )
+
2176α2V2C
(1− α)2B︸ ︷︷ ︸
B=O
(
α2
ǫ
)
.
Using the above, EGcomp, SN(ǫ) can be computed as:
Corollary 3 Under the assumptions stated in Theorem 2:
(i): We have: EGcomp, SN(ǫ) ≤ O˜
(
1
ǫ5/3K2/3
+ α
4/3
ǫ5/3
)
where O˜(·) hides the log factors.
(ii) Moreover, when α = 0 we have: EGcomp, SN(ǫ) ≤ O
(
1
ǫ5/3K2/3
)
.
Note that for the case when α = 0 and k ≤ 1/ǫ, our algorithm improves upon the best known
convergence rates of O
(
1
ǫ2K
)
for distributed stochastic non-convex optimization given in Jiang
and Agrawal [5], Yu et al. [16]. Moreover, if Algorithm 1 is run only at the SN, we achieve
EGcomp, SN(ǫ) ≤ O
(
1
ǫ5/3
)
which is the same as is computed in Lei et al. [7].
5. Conclusion
In this work, we proposed the first non-convex SVRG like algorithm which considers distributed
optimization in the presence of Byzantine nodes. We proposed a novel aggregation rule which is
independent of the problem dimension, d. Importantly, we captured the effect of Byzantine nodes
in the network and showed that the proposed algorithm outperforms the best known convergence
rates known in the literature in the presence of Byzantine nodes.
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Appendix A.
For the purpose of the proof, we consider a more general model where the nodes can choose different
batch sizes, Bt, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , across epochs. For varying batch sizes in Algorithm 1 the
Byzantine filtering constant Tµ will be evaluated inside the epochs and will be a function of Bt.
Rest of the algorithm will stay the same. Our proof follows the structure similar to the one in Lei
et al. [7] with a few major differences. The problem considered in Lei et al. [7] was a finite sum
problem with all the gradient computations designated at the central node. The key novelty in our
proof lies in proving the boundedness of the norm square of the error term et (see Lemma 7).
Proof of Theorem 2: Using the smoothness of function f we have:
Eξtn
f(xtn+1) ≤ f(x
t
n)− ηt〈Eξtnv
t
n,∇f(x
t
n)〉+
Lη2t
2
Eξtn
‖vtn‖
2
(a)
≤ f(xtn)− ηt(1− Lηt)‖∇f(x
t
n)‖
2
− ηt〈et,∇f(x
t
n)〉+
L3η2t
2
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + Lη2t ‖et‖
2 (2)
where (a) follows from Lemma 4. Denoting by Et the expectation w.r.t. all ξ
t
1, ξ
t
2, . . . given Nt.
Since ξt1, ξ
t
2, . . . are independent of Nt, Et is equivalent to expectation w.r.t. ξ
t
1, ξ
t
2, . . .. We have
from above
Etf(x
t
n+1) ≤ Etf(x
t
n)− ηt(1− Lηt)Et‖∇f(x
t
n)‖
2
− ηtEt〈et,∇f(x
t
n)〉+
L3η2t
2
Et‖x
t
n − x
t
0‖
2 + Lη2t ‖et‖
2
Now taking n = Nt and denoting by ENt expectation w.r.t. Nt we get:
ENtEtf(x
t
Nt+1) ≤ ENtEtf(x
t
Nt)− ηt(1− Lηt)ENtEt‖∇f(x
t
Nt)‖
2
− ηtENtEt〈et,∇f(x
t
Nt)〉+
L3η2t
2
ENtEt‖x
t
Nt − x
t
0‖
2 + Lη2t ‖et‖
2
Using Fubini’s theorem and rearranging the terms we have
ηt(1− Lηt)ENtEt‖∇f(x
t
Nt)‖
2 ≤ ENtEtf(x
t
Nt)− ENtEtf(x
t
Nt+1)
− ηtENtEt〈et,∇f(x
t
Nt)〉+
L3η2t
2
ENtEt‖x
t
Nt − x
t
0‖
2 + Lη2t ‖et‖
2
(a)
=
1
Bt
[f(xt0)− EtENtf(x
t
Nt)]
− ηtENtEt〈et,∇f(x
t
Nt)〉+
L3η2t
2
ENtEt‖x
t
Nt − x
t
0‖
2 + Lη2t ‖et‖
2
8
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where (a) follows from Lemma 11, Lemma 12 and Fubini’s theorem. Now taking expectation over
all the randomness and using the fact that xtNt = x˜t and x˜t−1 = x
t
0 we get
ηt(1− Lηt)E‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2 ≤
1
Bt
E[f(x˜t−1)− f(x˜t)]− ηtE〈et,∇f(x˜t)〉
+
L3η2t
2
E‖x˜t − x˜t−1‖
2 + Lη2tE‖et‖
2
(a)
=
1
Bt
E[f(x˜t−1)− f(x˜t)] +
1
Bt
E〈et, x˜t − x˜t−1〉
+
L3η2t
2
E‖x˜t − x˜t−1‖
2 + ηt(1 + Lηt)E‖et‖
2
(b)
≤
1
Bt
E[f(x˜t−1)− f(x˜t)] +
(
1
2ηtBt
(
−
1
Bt
+ η2tL
2
))
E‖x˜t − x˜t−1‖
2
−
1
Bt
E〈∇f(x˜t), x˜t − x˜t−1〉+
ηt
Bt
E‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2 +
ηt
Bt
E‖et‖
2
+
L3η2t
2
E‖x˜t − x˜t−1‖
2 + ηt(1 + Lηt)E‖et‖
2
where (a) follows from Lemma 5, (b) follows from Lemma 6. Rearranging the terms to get:
ηt
(
1− Lηt −
1
Bt
)
E‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2 +
(
1− η2tL
2Bt − η
3
tL
3B2t
2ηtB
2
t
)
E‖x˜t − x˜t−1‖
2
≤
1
Bt
E[f(x˜t−1)− f(x˜t)] +
1
Bt
E〈∇f(x˜t), x˜t−1 − x˜t〉+ ηt
(
1 + Lηt +
1
Bt
)
E‖et‖
2.
Now using the Young’s inequality E〈a, b〉 ≤ E
[
β
2 ‖a‖
2 + 12β‖b‖
2
]
on E〈∇f(x˜t), x˜t−1 − x˜t〉 with
β =
1− η2tL
2Bt − η
3
tL
3B2t
ηtBt
, a = x˜t−1 − x˜t and b = ∇f(x˜t).
we get
ηt
(
1− Lηt −
1
Bt
−
1
2(1− η2tL
2Bt − η3tL
3B2t )
)
E‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2
≤
1
Bt
E[f(x˜t−1)− f(x˜t)] + ηt
(
1 + Lηt +
1
Bt
)
E‖et‖
2
ηt
(
1− Lηt −
1
Bt
−
1
2(1− η2tL
2Bt − η3tL
3B2t )
)
E‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2
(a)
≤
1
Bt
E[f(x˜t−1)− f(x˜t)] + ηt
(
1 + Lηt +
1
Bt
)(
4V2
(1− α)2KBt
+
272α2V2C
(1− α)2Bt
)
.
(3)
where (a) follows from Lemma 7.
Choosing ηt such that we have 1− η
2
tL
2Bt − η
3
tL
3B2t > 0, this implies that we have
1
2(1 − η2tL
2Bt − η
3
tL
3B2t )
>
1
2
.
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Further we choose ηt such that we have:
1− Lηt −
1
Bt
−
1
2(1− η2tL
2Bt − η
3
tL
3B2t )
≥
1
4
Lηt +
1
Bt
+
1
2(1− η2tL
2Bt − η3tL
3B2t )
≤
3
4
.
Choosing ηt such that we can ensure:
(i) :
1
2
<
1
2(1 − η2tL
2Bt − η
3
tL
3B2t )
≤
5
8
, (ii) : Lηt ≤
1
16
and (iii) :
1
Bt
≤
1
16
.
Condition (i) above implies:
η2tL
2Bt + η
3
tL
3B2t ≤
1
5
.
Further ensuring ηt such that
η2tL
2Bt ≤
1
10
and η3tL
3B2t ≤
1
10
.
This implies that
ηt ≤
1
101/2LB
1/2
t
and ηt ≤
1
101/3LB
2/3
t
.
Furthermore from conditions (ii) and (iii) above we get:
ηt ≤
1
16L
and Bt ≥ 16.
The above discussion implies that we must have Bt ≥ 16 and we can choose ηt ≤
1
3LB
2/3
t
as we
have
1
3LB
2/3
t
≤ min
{
1
16L
,
1
101/3LB
2/3
t
,
1
101/2LB
1/2
t
}
for Bt ≥ 16.
This choice of ηt ensures that the term:
1− Lηt −
1
Bt
−
1
2(1 − η2tL
2Bt − η
3
tL
3B2t )
≥
1
4
. (4)
Now replacing ηt and Bt in the term:
1 + ηtL+
1
Bt
≤ 1 +
1
3B
2/3
t
+
1
Bt
≤ 2. (5)
Now replacing (4) and (5) in (3), and replacing ηt =
1
3LB
2/3
t
we get
ηt
4
E‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2 ≤
1
Bt
E[f(x˜t−1)− f(x˜t)] + 2ηt
(
4V2
(1− α)2KBt
+
272α2V2C
(1− α)2Bt
)
E‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2 ≤
12LE[f(x˜t−1)− f(x˜t)]
B
1/3
t
+
32V2
(1− α)2KBt
+
2176α2V2C
(1− α)2Bt
.
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Constant batch size: For Bt = B and summing over t = 1, 2, . . . , T and choosing xa using
Algorithm 1 we get:
E‖∇f(x˜a)‖
2
≤
12LE[f(x˜0)− f(x˜
∗)] + 32V2(1− α)−2K−1
∑T
t=1B
−2/3
t + 2176α
2V2C(1− α)−2
∑T
t=1B
−2/3
t∑T
t=1B
1/3
t
.
Replace Bt = B we get:
E‖∇f(x˜a)‖
2 ≤
12LE[f(x˜0)− f(x˜
∗)]
TB1/3︸ ︷︷ ︸
T=O
(
1
ǫB1/3
)
+
32V2
(1− α)2KB︸ ︷︷ ︸
B=O( 1ǫK )
+
2176α2V2C
(1− α)2B︸ ︷︷ ︸
B=O
(
α2
ǫ
)
.
Now to guarantee that we get an ǫ-accurate solution we need: T = O
(
1
ǫB1/3
)
number of iterations
for the first term. For the second term, we need BK = O
(
1
ǫK
)
batch size and for the third term,
we need Bα = O
(
α2
ǫ
)
batch size to account for the Byzantine workers. This implies that the total
number of gradient computations, EGcomp, SN required at the SN (and at the individual WNs) on an
average are of the order of:
EGcomp, SN(ǫ) ≤ TBK + TBα
EGcomp, SN(ǫ) ≤ O
(
1
ǫ5/3K2/3
+
α4/3
ǫ5/3
)
.
And the expected number of gradient computations across the network denoted by, EGcomp, NW, are
of the order of:
EGcomp, NW(ǫ) ≤ O
(
K1/3
ǫ5/3
+
Kα4/3
ǫ5/3
)
.
Moreover, note that if we have α = 0 we get the expected computational complexity and the
expected number of gradient computations across the network are of the order of:
EGcomp, SN(ǫ) ≤ O
(
1
ǫ5/3K2/3
)
and EGcomp, NW(ǫ) ≤ O
(
K1/3
ǫ5/3
)
.

Lemma 4 We have
Eξtn
‖vtn‖
2 ≤ L2‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + 2‖∇f(xtn)‖
2 + 2‖et‖
2.
Proof From the definition of vtn we have:
vtn = ∇f(x
t
n; ξ
t
n)−∇f(x
t
0; ξ
t
n) + µt.
11
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where µt =
1
|Gt|
∑
k∈Gt
µ
(k)
t . We define
et = µt −∇f(x
t
0) = µt −∇f(x˜t−1).
This implies that we have
Eξtn
vtn = ∇f(x
t
n) + et.
Now taking Eξtn‖v
t
n‖
2 and using E‖Z‖2 = E‖Z − EZ‖2 + ‖EZ‖2, we have
Eξtn
‖vtn‖
2 = Eξtn‖v
t
n − Eξtnv
t
n‖
2 + ‖Eξtnv
t
n‖
2
= Eξtn‖∇f(x
t
n; ξ
t
n)−∇f(x
t
0; ξ
t
n)− (∇f(x
t
n)−∇f(x
t
0))‖
2 + ‖∇f(xtn) + et‖
2
(a)
≤ Eξtn‖∇f(x
t
n; ξ
t
n)−∇f(x
t
0; ξ
t
n)− (∇f(x
t
n)−∇f(x
t
0))‖
2 + 2‖∇f(xtn)‖
2 + 2‖et‖
2
(b)
≤ Eξtn‖∇f(x
t
n; ξ
t
n)−∇f(x
t
0; ξ
t
n)‖
2 + 2‖∇f(xtn)‖
2 + 2‖et‖
2
(c)
≤ L2‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + 2‖∇f(xtn)‖
2 + 2‖et‖
2.
where (a) follows from the definition of vtn and Lemma 14, (b) follows from variance inequality
and (c) follows from the Gradient Lipschitz continuity of f(· ; ξtn).
Lemma 5 We have
ηtE〈et,∇f(x˜t)〉 =
1
Bt
E〈et, x˜t−1 − x˜t〉 − ηtE‖et‖
2.
Proof Consider the termM tn = 〈et, x
t
n − x
t
0〉. From the definition ofM
t
n we have
M tn+1 −M
t
n = 〈et, x
t
n+1 − x
t
n〉 = −ηt〈et, v
t
n〉.
Taking expectation w.r.t. ξtn, we have
Eξtn
(M tn+1 −M
t
n) = −ηt〈et,Eξtnv
t
n〉
(a)
= −ηt〈et,∇f(x
t
n)〉 − ηt‖et‖
2,
where (a) follows from the definition of vtn. Denoting by Et the expectation w.r.t. all ξ
t
1, ξ
t
2, . . .
given Nt. Since ξ
t
1, ξ
t
2, . . . are independent of Nt, Et is equivalent to expectation w.r.t. ξ
t
1, ξ
t
2, . . ..
We have
Et(M
t
n+1 −M
t
n) = −ηt〈et,Et∇f(x
t
n)〉 − ηt‖et‖
2.
Taking n = Nt and expectation w.r.t. Nt as ENt we have
ENtEt(M
t
Nt+1 −M
t
Nt) = −ηt〈et,ENtEt∇f(x
t
Nt)〉 − ηt‖et‖
2.
Using Fubini’s theorem, Lemma 11, Lemma 12 and using the fact xtNt = x˜t and x˜t−1 = x
t
0, we
have
1
Bt
ENtEt〈et, x˜t − x˜t−1〉 = −ηt〈et,ENtEt∇f(x˜t)〉 − ηt‖et‖
2.
Taking expectation w.r.t. the whole past yields the statement of the lemma.
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Lemma 6 We have
2ηtE〈et, x˜t − x˜t−1〉 ≤
(
−
1
Bt
+ η2tL
2
)
E‖x˜t − x˜t−1‖
2
− 2ηtE〈∇f(x˜t), x˜t − x˜t−1〉+ 2η
2
tE‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2 + 2η2tE‖et‖
2.
Proof We have from the update equation xtn+1 = x
t
n − ηtv
t
n, we have
Eξtn
‖xtn+1 − x
t
0‖
2 = Eξtn‖x
t
n − ηtv
t
n − x
t
0‖
2
= ‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + η2tEξtn‖v
t
n‖
2 − 2ηt〈Eξtnv
t
n, x
t
n − x
t
0〉
(a)
≤ (1 + η2tL
2)‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 − 2ηt〈∇f(x
t
n), x
t
n − x
t
0〉
− 2ηt〈et, x
t
n − x
t
0〉+ 2η
2
t ‖∇f(x
t
n)‖
2 + 2η2t ‖et‖
2 (6)
where (a) follows from Lemma 4 and the definition of vtn. Denoting by Et the expectation w.r.t.
all ξt1, ξ
t
2, . . . given Nt. Since ξ
t
1, ξ
t
2, . . . are independent of Nt, Et is equivalent to expectation w.r.t.
ξt1, ξ
t
2, . . .. We have
Et‖x
t
n+1 − x
t
0‖
2 ≤ (1 + η2tL
2)Et‖x
t
n − x
t
0‖
2 − 2ηtEt〈∇f(x
t
n), x
t
n − x
t
0〉
− 2ηtEt〈et, x
t
n − x
t
0〉+ 2η
2
tEt‖∇f(x
t
n)‖
2 + 2η2t ‖et‖
2.
Now taking n = Nt and taking expectation ENt w.r.t. Nt we have
2ηtENtEt〈et, x˜t − x˜t−1〉 ≤ (1 + η
2
tL
2)ENtEt‖x
t
Nt − x
t
0‖
2 − ENtEt‖x
t
Nt+1 − x
t
0‖
2
− 2ηtENtEt〈∇f(x˜t), x˜t − x˜t−1〉+ 2η
2
tENtEt‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2 + 2η2t ‖et‖
2
(a)
=
(
−
1
Bt
+ η2tL
2
)
ENtEt‖x˜t − x˜t−1‖
2
− 2ηtENtEt〈∇f(x˜t), x˜t − x˜t−1〉+ 2η
2
tENtEt‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2 + 2η2t ‖et‖
2.
where (a) follows from Lemma 11, Lemma 12 and Fubini’s theorem. Finally, rearranging the terms
and taking expectation w.r.t. the whole past yields the lemma.
Lemma 7 Choosing δ and Bt in Algorithm 1 such that the following are satisfied:
(i) e
δBt
2(1−2δ) ≤ 2Kδ ≤ e
Bt
2 .
(ii) δ ≤ 125KBt .
then E‖et‖
2 is bounded as:
E‖et‖
2 ≤
4V2
(1− α)2KBt
+
272α2V2C
(1− α)2Bt
.
Proof From the definition et = µt −∇f(x˜t−1), where µt =
1
|Gt|
∑
k∈Gt
µ
(k)
t . Therefore, we have
E‖et‖
2 = E
∥∥∥∥ 1|Gt|
∑
k∈Gt
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
)∥∥∥∥2
Now let us define three types of events and their complements:
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Definition 8 We define three events and their complements which will be used to bound E‖et‖
2:
1. Event A (Event A!): We denote the event of Lemma 9 as Event A, we define it again here for
convenience. For all good nodes k ∈ G we have:
(a) ‖µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)‖ ≤ V
√
C
Bt
.
(b) ‖µ
(k)
t − µ
med
t ‖ ≤ 4V
√
C
Bt
and ‖µmedt −∇f(x˜t−1)‖ ≤ 3V
√
C
Bt
.
Note that we have P[Event A] ≥ 1 − δ. The complement of Event A is denoted as Event A!
and we have P[Event A!] ≤ δ.
2. Event A¯ (Event A¯!): We define Event A¯ as G ⊂ Gt. Consequently, Event A¯! is defined as
G 6⊂ Gt.
3. Event R1 (Event R2): We define Event R1 as the event that Rule 1 is executed. And Event
R2 is the complement of Rule R1 and indicates that Rule 2 is executed. Rule 1 and Rule 2
are defined below for convenience.
Rule 1: Gt = {k ∈ [K] : ‖µ
(k)
t − µ
med
t ‖ ≤ 2Tµ}; for median evaluated as:
µmedt ← µ
(k)
t where k ∈ [K] is any WN such that |{k
′ ∈ [K] : ‖µ
(k′)
t − µ
(k)
t ‖ ≤ Tµ}| > K/2;
In case |Gt| < (1− α)K we use:
Rule 2: Gt = {k ∈ [K] : ‖µ
(k)
t − µ
med
t ‖ ≤ 4V} for median evaluated as:
µmedt ← µ
(k)
t where k ∈ [K] is any WN s.t. |{k
′ ∈ [K] : ‖µ
(k′)
t − µ
(k)
t ‖ ≤ 2V}| > K/2;
Relationship between events:
• Note from Lemma 9 and from Definition 8 of Event A we have: Event A ⊂ Event A¯. This
and Lemma 9 imply that we have:
P[Event A¯] ≥ P[Event A] ≥ 1− δ. (7)
• Consider Event A¯! as given in Definition 8. From above we have Event A! ⊃ Event A¯!. This
along with Lemma 9 imply that we have:
P[Event A¯!] ≤ P[Event A!] ≤ δ. (8)
• From the definition of Event R1 and Event A in Definition 8 we have: Event A ⊂ Event R1.
This further implies from Lemma 9 that we have:
P[Event R1] ≥ P[Event A] ≥ 1− δ (9)
• Event R2 is complement of Event R1. This and the above implies Event R2 ⊂ Event A!.
Thus we have from Lemma 9:
P[Event R2] ≤ P[Event A!] ≤ δ (10)
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Now we can write E‖et‖
2 as:
E‖et‖
2 (a)= P[Event A¯] E
[
‖et‖
2|Event A¯
]
+ P[Event A¯!] E
[
‖et‖
2|Event A¯!
]
(b)
≤ E
[
‖et‖
2|Event A¯
]
+ δ E
[
‖et‖
2|Event A¯!
]
(11)
where (a) follows from the law of total expectation and (b) follows from (7) and (8) above. Now
let us first consider the first term E
[
‖et‖
2|Event A¯
]
under Event A¯:
E
[
‖et‖
2|Event A¯
]
= E

∥∥∥∥ 1|Gt|
∑
k∈Gt
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
) ∥∥∥∥2
∣∣∣∣Event A¯


(a)
≤
1
(1− α)2K2
E

∥∥∥∥∑
k∈G
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
)
+
∑
k∈Gt\G
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
) ∥∥∥∥2
∣∣∣∣

 under Event A¯
(b)
≤
2
(1− α)2K2
(
E
[∥∥∥∥∑
k∈G
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
) ∥∥∥∥2
]
+ E
[∥∥∥∥ ∑
k∈Gt\G
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
) ∥∥∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
IGt\G
])
under Event A¯
(12)
where (a) follows from the fact that |Gt| ≥ (1−α)K and Event A¯ implies G ⊂ G. (b) follows from
Lemma 14. Now considering the two terms separately under Event A¯, first consider the terms for
k ∈ G:
E
∥∥∥∥∑
k∈G
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
) ∥∥∥∥2 = E
∥∥∥∥∑
k∈G
(
1
Bt
Bt∑
i=1
∇f(x˜t−1; ξ
(k)
t,i )−∇f(x˜t−1)
)∥∥∥∥2
(a)
=
1
B2t
E
[∑
k∈G
Bt∑
i=1
∥∥∇f(x˜t−1; ξ(k)t,i )−∇f(x˜t−1)∥∥2
]
+
1
B2t
E

 ∑
(k,i)6=(k′,i′),k,k′∈G
〈∇f(x˜t−1; ξ
(k)
t,i )−∇f(x˜t−1),∇f(x˜t−1; ξ
(k′)
t,i′ )−∇f(x˜t−1)〉


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=
1
B2t
E
[∑
k∈G
Bt∑
i=1
∥∥∇f(x˜t−1; ξ(k)t,i )−∇f(x˜t−1)∥∥2
]
(b)
≤
KV2
Bt
(13)
where (a) follows from the fact that f(x˜t−1; ξ
(k)
t,i ) are chosen uniformly independently across i and
k. (b) follows from Assumption 2 and the fact that |G| ≤ K . Now consider the second term in (12)
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defined as:
E[IGt\G
∣∣Event A¯] = E

∥∥∥∥ ∑
k∈Gt\G
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
)∥∥∥∥2

 under Event A¯
Note that all the nodes k ∈ Gt\G under Event A¯ can come either from Rule 1 (Event R1 is
true) or from Rule 2 (Event R2 is true). Again using the law of total expectation we can write
E[IGt\G
∣∣Event A¯] as:
E[IGt\G
∣∣Event A¯] (a)= P[Event R1∣∣Event A¯] E[IGt\G∣∣Event A¯,Event R1]
+ P[Event R2
∣∣Event A¯] E[IGt\G∣∣Event A¯,Event R2]
(b)
≤ E[IGt\G
∣∣Event A¯,Event R1] + ( δ
1− δ
)
E[IGt\G
∣∣Event A¯,Event R2]. (14)
where (a) follows from the fact that Event R2 is the complement of Event R1 and the application
of the law of total expectation. (b) follows form the following:
P[Event R2
∣∣Event A¯] (c)= P[Event R2 ∩ Event A¯]
P[Event A¯]
(d)
≤
P[Event R2]
P[Event A¯]
(e)
≤
δ
1− δ
.
where (c) follows since P[Event A¯] 6= 0. (d) follows since [Event R2 ∩ Event A¯] ⊂ Event R2 and
finally, (e) follow from (10) and (7).
Now let us consider the first term of (14), we have:
E[IGt\G
∣∣Event A¯,Event R1] = E
[∥∥∥∥ ∑
k∈Gt\G
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
)∥∥∥∥2
]
under Event A¯,Event R1
(a)
≤ αK E

 ∑
k∈Gt\G
∥∥µ(k)t −∇f(x˜t−1)∥∥2

 under Event A¯,Event R1
(b)
≤ 2αK E

 ∑
k∈Gt\G
∥∥µ(k)t − µmedt ∥∥2


+ 2αK E
[ ∑
k∈Gt\G
∥∥µmedt −∇f(x˜t−1)∥∥2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
JGt\G
]
under Event A¯,Event R1
(c)
≤ 2αK
[
αK
16V2C
Bt
]
+ 2αK
[
αK
18V2C
Bt
]
=
68α2K2V2C
Bt
. (15)
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where (a) follows from Lemma 14 and the fact that |Gt\G| ≤ αK, (b) follows by adding and
subtracting µmedt and applying Lemma 14 and (c) follows from:
E[JGt\G
∣∣Event A¯,Event R1]
= P[Event A
∣∣Event A¯,Event R1] E[JGt\G∣∣Event A,Event A¯,Event R1]
+ P[Event A!
∣∣Event A¯,Event R1] E[JGt\G∣∣Event A!,Event A¯,Event R1]
(d)
≤ E[JGt\G
∣∣Event A,Event A¯,Event R1] + ( δ
1− 2δ
)
E[JGt\G
∣∣Event A!,Event A¯,Event R1]
(e)
≤ αK
9V2C
Bt
+
(
δ
1− 2δ
)
αK9V2
(f)
≤ αK
18V2C
Bt
,
where (d) follows from:
P[Event A!
∣∣Event A¯,Event R1] = P[Event A!,Event A¯,Event R1]
P[Event A¯,Event R1]
≤
P[Event A!]
P[Event A¯,Event R1]
(g)
≤
δ
1− 2δ
,
where (g) follows from the fact that we have:
P[Event A¯∩ EventR1] = P[Event A¯]+P[EventR1]−P[Event A¯∪ EventR1] ≥ 1−δ+1−δ−1 = 1−2δ.
Moreover, (e) follows from the application of Lemma 9 and Lemma 10. Finally, (f) follows from
choosing δ such that:
e
δBt
2(1−2δ) ≤
2K
δ
.
Now let us consider the second term of (14), we have:
E[IGt\G
∣∣Event A¯,Event R2] = E
[∥∥∥∥ ∑
k∈Gt\G
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
)∥∥∥∥2
]
under Event A¯,Event R2
(a)
≤ αK E

 ∑
k∈Gt\G
∥∥µ(k)t −∇f(x˜t−1)∥∥2

 under Event A¯,Event R2
(b)
≤ 2αK E

 ∑
k∈Gt\G
∥∥µ(k)t − µmedt ∥∥2


+ 2αK E

 ∑
k∈Gt\G
∥∥µmedt −∇f(x˜t−1)∥∥2

 under Event A¯,Event R2
(c)
≤ 2αK
[
16αKV2
]
+ 2αK
[
9αKV2
]
= 50α2K2V2 < 68α2K2V2. (16)
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where (a) follows from Lemma 14 and the fact that |Gt\G| ≤ αK, (b) follows by adding and
subtracting µmedt and applying Lemma 14 and (c) follows from the fact that under Event R2 all
nodes k ∈ Gt\G must satisfy Lemma 10 statement (b). Now replacing (15) and (16) in (14) we get:
E[IGt\G
∣∣Event A¯] ≤ 68α2K2V2C
Bt
+
(
δ
1− δ
)
68α2K2V2
(a)
≤
136α2K2V2C
Bt
. (17)
where (a) follows from choosing δ such that:
e
δBt
2(1−δ) ≤
2K
δ
.
Replacing (13) and (17) in (12), we have the bound on the first term of (11) as:
E
[
‖et‖
2|Event A¯
]
≤
2
(1− α)2K2
(
KV2
Bt
+
136α2K2V2C
Bt
)
=
2V2
(1− α)2KBt
+
272α2V2C
(1− α)2Bt
. (18)
We have bounded the first term of (11). Now let us consider the second term of (11):
δ E
[
‖et‖
2|Event A¯!
]
= δ E
[∥∥∥∥ 1|Gt|
∑
k∈Gt
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
)∥∥∥∥2
]
under Event A¯!
(a)
≤
δ
(1− α)2K2
E
[∥∥ ∑
k∈Gt
(
µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)
) ∥∥2] under Event A¯!
(b)
≤
δ
(1− α)2K
E
[∑
k∈Gt
∥∥µ(k)t −∇f(x˜t−1)∥∥2
]
under Event A¯!
(c)
≤
2δ
(1− α)2K
(
E
[ ∑
k∈Gt
∥∥µ(k)t − µmedt ∥∥2
]
+ E
[∑
k∈Gt
∥∥µmedt −∇f(x˜t−1)∥∥2
])
under Event A¯!
(d)
≤
2δ
(1− α)2K
(
16KV2 + 9KV2
)
= δ
50V2
(1− α)2
. (19)
where (a) follows from the fact that |Gt| ≥ (1 − α)K . (b) follows from Lemma 14 and the fact
that |Gt| ≤ K . (c) follows from adding and subtracting µ
med
t and applying Lemma 14. Finally, (d)
follows by assuimg 2Kδ ≤ e
Bt
2 and |Gt| ≤ K . The assumption
2K
δ ≤ e
Bt
2 ensures that in the worst
case the terms in inequality (c) are bounded.
Finally, replacing (18) and (19) in (11) we get:
E‖et‖
2 ≤
2V2
(1− α)2KBt
+
272α2V2C
(1− α)2Bt
+ δ
50V2
(1− α)2
(a)
≤
4V2
(1− α)2KBt
+
272α2V2C
(1− α)2Bt
.
where (a) follows by choosing δ ≤ 125KBt . Therefore, we have the bound.
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Lemma 9 For any t ∈ [T ] and for all k ∈ G with probability at least 1 − δ (we call this event as
Event A) we have:
(a): ‖µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)‖ ≤ V
√
C
Bt
.
(b): This further implies that we have ‖µ
(k)
t −µ
med
t ‖ ≤ 4V
√
C
Bt
and ‖µmedt −∇f(x˜t−1)‖ ≤ 3V
√
C
Bt
.
where C is defined as: C = 2 log
(
2K
δ
)
.
Let us denote this event as Event A.
Proof (a) The proof follows by considering the random variable, ∇f(x˜t−1; ξ
(k)
t,i )−∇f(x˜t−1) and
from Assumption 2 we have ‖∇f(x˜t−1; ξ
(k)
t,i ) − ∇f(x˜t−1)‖ ≤ V . Now applying Lemma 13 on
the summation with ‖µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)‖ = ‖
1
Bt
∑Bt
i=1
(
∇f(x˜t−1; ξ
(k)
t,i )−∇f(x˜t−1)
)
‖, we get the
result.
(b) follows from the straightforward application of the above result.
Note that we call the above event by Event A and we have that the probability of Event A being
true as: P[Event A] ≥ 1− δ from Lemma 9 and the discussion above. Now let us consider the case
when Event A! (Complement of Event A) is true. In that case, the discussion above implies that we
have P[Event A!] ≤ δ.
For the case when the set |Gt| < (1 − α)K (please see Algorithm 1), we will make use of the
following lemma.
Lemma 10 For any t ∈ [T ] and for all k ∈ G we have:
(a): ‖µ
(k)
t −∇f(x˜t−1)‖ ≤ V .
(b): This further implies that we have ‖µ
(k)
t − µ
med
t ‖ ≤ 4V and ‖µ
med
t −∇f(x˜t−1)‖ ≤ 3V .
Proof (a) The proof follows from the definition of µ
(k)
t and the application of the triangle inequality
along with Assumption 2.
(b) follows from the straightforward application of the above.
Lemma 11 If N ∼ Geom(Γ) for Γ > 0. Then for any sequence D0,D1, . . . with E|DN | <∞, we
have
E[DN −DN+1] =
(
1
Γ
− 1
)
(D0 − EDN )
Proof Proof follows from Lei et al. [7].
Lemma 12 For step size ηt ≤
1
3LB
2/3
t
, we have:
(i) E‖x˜t − x˜t−1‖
2 <∞.
(ii) E(f(x˜t)− f(x˜
∗)) <∞.
(iii) E‖∇f(x˜t)‖
2 <∞.
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(iv) E|〈et, x˜t − x˜t−1〉| <∞.
(v) E|〈et,∇f(x˜t)〉| <∞.
Proof The lemma is proven using induction and follows the same structure as the proof in Lei et al.
[7]. The second inequality (2) in the proof of theorem yields
Eξtn
f(xtn+1) ≤ f(x
t
n)− ηt(1− Lηt)‖∇f(x
t
n)‖
2
− ηt〈et,∇f(x
t
n)〉+
L3η2t
2
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + Lη2t ‖et‖
2, (20)
using Young’s inequality 〈a, b〉 ≤ 12β‖a‖
2 + β2 ‖b‖
2 for any β > 0, on −ηt〈et,∇f(x
t
n)〉 with β =
1
2
we get:
−ηt〈et,∇f(x
t
n)〉 ≤ ηt‖et‖
2 +
ηt
4
‖∇f(xtn)‖
2.
Moreover, using the fact that ηt ≤
1
3LB
2/3
t
≤ 14L since Bt ≥ 16 and rearranging the terms in (20)
we have
ηt
(
1− Lηt −
1
4
)
‖∇f(xtn)‖
2
≤ f(xtn)− Eξtnf(x
t
n+1) +
L3η2t
2
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + ηt(1 + Lηt)‖et‖
2
ηt
(
1−
1
4
−
1
4
)
‖∇f(xtn)‖
2
≤ f(xtn)− Eξtnf(x
t
n+1) +
L3η2t
2
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + ηt
(
1 +
1
4
)
‖et‖
2
ηt‖∇f(x
t
n)‖
2 ≤ 2
(
f(xtn)− Eξtnf(x
t
n+1)
)
+ L3η2t ‖x
t
n − x
t
0‖
2 +
5ηt
2
‖et‖
2. (21)
Now using the first inequality (6) in Proof of Lemma 6, we have
Eξtn
‖xtn+1 − x
t
0‖
2 ≤ (1 + η2tL
2)‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 − 2ηt〈∇f(x
t
n), x
t
n − x
t
0〉
− 2ηt〈et, x
t
n − x
t
0〉+ 2η
2
t ‖∇f(x
t
n)‖
2 + 2η2t ‖et‖
2,
using Young’s inequality 〈a, b〉 ≤ β2 ‖a‖
2 + 12β ‖b‖
2 for any β > 0, on −2ηt〈∇f(x
t
n), x
t
n − x
t
0〉 and
−2ηt〈et, x
t
n − x
t
0〉 with β = 8ηtBt we get:
−2ηt〈∇f(x
t
n), x
t
n − x
t
0〉 ≤ 8η
2
tBt‖∇f(x
t
n)‖
2 +
1
8Bt
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2
−2ηt〈et, x
t
n − x
t
0〉 ≤ 8η
2
tBt‖et‖
2 +
1
8Bt
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2,
Therefore, we get:
Eξtn
‖xtn+1 − x
t
0‖
2
≤
(
1 + η2tL
2 +
1
4Bt
)
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + (2η2t + 8η
2
tBt)‖∇f(x
t
n)‖
2 + (2η2t + 8η
2
tBt)‖et‖
2
(a)
≤
(
1 +
13
36Bt
)
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + 10η2tBt‖∇f(x
t
n)‖
2 + 10η2tBt‖et‖
2 (22)
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where (a) used the fact that we ηtL ≤
1
3B
2/3
t
. Now plugging (21) into (22) we get:
Eξtn
‖xtn+1 − x
t
0‖
2 ≤
(
1 +
13
36Bt
)
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + 10η2tBt‖et‖
2
+ 20ηtBt
(
f(xtn)− Eξtnf(x
t
n+1)
)
+ 10η3t L
3Bt‖x
t
n − x
t
0‖
2 + 25η2tBt‖et‖
2
≤
(
1 +
13
36Bt
+ 10η3tL
3Bt
)
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + 20ηtBt
(
f(xtn)− Eξtnf(x
t
n+1)
)
+ 35η2tBt‖et‖
2
(a)
≤
(
1 +
711
972Bt
)
‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2 + 20ηtBt
(
f(xtn)− Eξtnf(x
t
n+1)
)
+ 35η2tBt‖et‖
2 (23)
where (a) follows from using ηtL ≤
1
3B
2/3
t
. Let us assume
Ltn = 20ηtBtE
(
f(xtn)− f(x˜
∗)
)
+ E‖xtn − x
t
0‖
2
Taking expectation over (23) we get:
Ltn+1 ≤
(
1 +
711
972Bt
)
Ltn + 35η
2
tBtE‖et‖
2
Denoting γ = 711972 < 1 we have:
Ltn+1 ≤
(
1 +
γ
Bt
)
Ltn + 35η
2
tBtE‖et‖
2
Ltn+1 +
35η2tB
2
t E‖et‖
2
γ
(a)
≤
(
1 +
γ
Bt
)
Ltn +
(
1 +
γ
Bt
)
35η2tB
2
t E‖et‖
2
γ
Ltn+1 +
35η2tB
2
t E‖et‖
2
γ
≤
(
1 +
γ
Bt
)(
Ltn +
35η2tB
2
t E‖et‖
2
γ
)
where (a) follows from adding and subtracting
35η2tB
2
t E‖et‖
2
γ on both sides. this implies that we
have:
Ltn ≤
(
1 +
γ
Bt
)n(
Lt0 +
35η2tB
2
t E‖et‖
2
γ
)
Since we have: Nt ∼ Geom
(
Bt
Bt+1
)
, and assuming Nt can be 0 we have
P[Nt = n] =
1
Bt + 1
(
Bt
Bt + 1
)n
≤
(
Bt
Bt + 1
)n
.
Now the term:
E
[(
1 +
γ
Bt
)Nt]
≤
∑
n≥0
(
Bt + γ
Bt
×
Bt
Bt + 1
)n
=
∑
n≥0
(
Bt + γ
Bt + 1
)n
(a)
=
Bt + 1
1− γ
.
(a) follows since γ = 711972 < 1. This implies that:
ELtNt ≤
Bt + 1
1− γ
(
Lt0 + 70η
2
tBtE‖et‖
2
)
.
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which is finite since E‖et‖ < ∞ is finite by Lemma 7 as well as the filtering rule of Algorithm 1.
The induction hypothesis implies that ELNt <∞.
All the claims follow.
Lemma 13 (Alistarh et al. [1] Lemma 2.4) Let the sequence of random variablesX1,X2, . . . ,XN ∈
R
d represent a random process such that we have E[Xn|X1, . . . ,Xn−1] = 0 and ‖Xn‖ ≤M . Then,
P[‖X1 + . . .+XN‖
2 ≤ 2 log(2/δ)M2N ] ≥ 1− δ.
Lemma 14 For X1,X2, . . . ,Xn ∈ R
d, we have
‖X1 +X2 + . . .+Xn‖
2 ≤ n‖X1‖
2 + n‖X2‖
2 + . . . + n‖Xn‖
2.
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